Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to study the antitrust laws.

Cover title.

State antitrust laws /

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Authorizing the Attorney General to compel the production of documentary evidence required in civil investigations for the enforcement of the antitrust laws : report, to accompany S. 716.

"Calendar no. 446."

Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws /

No more published.

Administered prices: drugs. : Report of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, made by its Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, pursuant to S. Res. 52, Eighty-seventh Congress, first session, together with individual views to study the Antitrust laws of the United States, and their administration, interpretation, and effect /

Mode of access: Internet.

Debate handbook on antitrust laws and labor.

Mode of access: Internet.

The railroad merger problem. Report together with individual views of the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate pursuant to S. Res. 258, Eighty-seventh Congress, as extended providing for a study of the antitrust laws of the United States, and their administration, interpretation and effect.

At head of title: 88th Cong., 1st sess. Committee print.

Unfair practices in the meat packing industry. Report together with Minority views to accompany S. 1356, to amend the antitrust laws by vesting in the Federal Trade Commission jurisdiction to prevent monopolistic acts or practices and other unlawful restraints in commerce by certain persons engaged in commerce in meat and meat products, and for other purposes.

Mode of access: Internet.

Antitrust, regulatory capture and economic integration. Bruegel Policy Contribution ISSUE 2015/11, JULY 2015

There is growing worldwide concern about bias in the enforcement of competition law in favour of domestic firms. Even seemingly neutral antitrust laws can lead discrimination if they are enforced selectively. - Authors investigate the distortions that national competition authorities generate when they pursue non-competition goals in favour of domestic firms, and discuss ways to address this negative policy development in a globalised world. - The distortions identified in the paper would dissipate if governments agreed that the sole objective of competition law ought to be the protection of consumer welfare that competition-law institutions ought to be protected against capture. - A realistic and effective way to prompt international convergence towards independent enforcement of competition laws is through the inclusion of competition clauses in bilateral trade agreements and the development of dispute-resolution mechanisms.

Final report of the Lyme disease review panel of the Infectious Diseases Society of America.

In April 2008, the Infectious Diseases Society of America (IDSA) entered into an agreement with Connecticut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal to voluntarily undertake a special review of its 2006 Lyme disease guidelines. This agreement ended the Attorney General's investigation into the process by which the guidelines were developed. The IDSA agreed to convene an independent panel to conduct a one-time review of the guidelines. The Review Panel members, vetted by an ombudsman for potential conflicts of interest, reviewed the entirety of the 2006 guidelines, with particular attention to the recommendations devoted to post-Lyme disease syndromes. After multiple meetings, a public hearing, and extensive review of research and other information, the Review Panel concluded that the recommendations contained in the 2006 guidelines were medically and scientifically justified on the basis of all of the available evidence and that no changes to the guidelines were necessary.

Open Source und Kartellrecht

„Open source and European antitrust laws: An analysis of copyleft and the prohibition of software license fees on the basis of art. 101 TFEU and the block exemptions“ Open source software and open source licenses (like the GNU GPL) are not only relevant for computer nerds or activists – they are already business. They are for example the fundament of LINUX, the only real rival of MICROSOFT’s WINDOWS-line in the field of operating systems for IBM PC compatibles. Art. 101 TFEU (like the identical predecessor art. 81 TEC) as part of the EU antitrust laws prohibits contract terms like price fixing and some forms of technology control. Are copyleft – the „viral effect“, the „cancer“ – and the interdiction of software license fees in the cross hairs of this legal rule? On the other side the European Union has since 2004 a new Technology Transfer Block Exemption with software license agreements for the first time in its scope: a safe harbour and a dry place under a umbrella for open source software? After the introduction (A) with a description of open source software the following text analyses the system of the European Unions competition law respectivley antitrust law and the requirements of the block exemptions (B). Starting point of antitrust analysis are undertakings – but who are the untertakings (C) in the field of widespread, independent developers as part of the „bazar organization“? To see how much open source has to fear from the law of the European Union, at the end the anti competitive and pro competitive effects of open source are totalized within the legal framework (D). The conclusion (E) shows: not nothing, but not much.

An economic analysis of unilateral refusals to license intellectual property

The intellectual property laws in the United States provide the owners of intellectual property with discretion to license the right to use that property or to make or sell products that embody the intellectual property. However, the antitrust laws constrain the use of property, including intellectual property, by a firm with market power and may place limitations on the licensing of intellectual property. This paper focuses on one aspect of antitrust law, the so-called “essential facilities doctrine,” which may impose a duty upon firms controlling an “essential facility” to make that facility available to their rivals. In the intellectual property context, an obligation to make property available is equivalent to a requirement for compulsory licensing. Compulsory licensing may embrace the requirement that the owner of software permit access to the underlying code so that others can develop compatible application programs. Compulsory licensing may undermine incentives for research and development by reducing the value of an innovation to the inventor. This paper shows that compulsory licensing also may reduce economic efficiency in the short run by facilitating the entry of inefficient producers and by promoting licensing arrangements that result in higher prices.

Investigation of concentration of economic power; monograph no. 1[-43]

Printed for the use of the Temporary National Economic Committee.

Avoidance Techniques: State Related Defences in International Antitrust Cases

Despite its economic significance, competition law still remains fragmented, lacking an international framework allowing for dispute settlement. This, together with the growing importance of non-free-market economies in world trade require us to re-consider and re-evaluate the possibilities of bringing an antitrust suit against a foreign state. If the level playing field on the global marketplace is to be achieved, the possibility of hiding behind the bulwark of state sovereignty should be minimised. States should not be free to act in an anti-competitive way, but at present the legal framework seems ill-equipped to handle such challenges.

This paper deals with the defences available in litigation concerning transnational anti-competitive agreements involving or implicating foreign states. Four important legal doctrines are analysed: non-justiciability (political question doctrine), state immunity, act of state doctrine and foreign state compulsion. The paper addresses also the general problem of applicability of competition laws to a foreign state as such. This is a tale about repetitive unsuccessful efforts to sue OPEC and recent attempts in the US to deal with export cartels of Chinese state-owned enterprises